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Abstract: In this paper we present an interdisciplinary approach that con-
cerns the problem of argument acceptance in an agronomy setting. We propose
a computational cognitive model for argument acceptance based on the dual
model system in cognitive psychology. We apply it in an agronomy setting
within a french national project on durum wheat.
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1 Introduction
A lot of research has been done in domains such as philosophy, psychology
and computer science in order to study individual or collective decision-making
behaviors in humans [30]. One of the fascinating aspects that makes the human
reasoning such an impressive and flexible tool (but constitutes as well its greatest
danger) is the coupling of a deductive logical reasoning with intuitive reasoning.
This has been studied in the so called dual systems [23][18][19] and it has been
used for practical benefits such as biased reasoning prediction [31].
In this paper we take inspiration from the previously cited literature on
dual systems and propose a dual system for artificial agents with the benefit of
flexibility on the use of associations alongside logical reasoning for expanding
the notion of argument evaluation. A deductive reasoning, based on logical
rules of thought, ensures the quality and the rationality of the decision taken,
while an intuitive reasoning, based on associations between concepts, allows to
be fast and to apply old knowledge to new domains. But each of these is not
without its own pitfalls: a deductive logical reasoning might be too complex to
handle or might lead to an impasse, and an intuitive reasoning might produce
judgment mistakes, known as cognitive biases. Note that even very clever people
can behave dysrationally (as defined by Stanovich see [29]), because of gaps
or limitations in their education or experience or through heuristic trust or
fallacious reasoning.
Our contribution is the definition of a new formal model of flexible argument
evaluation. More precisely we show how such flexibility allows for generalization
of current techniques of argument evaluation and their suitability in practical
applications. We consider that, when it is not possible for an agent to make
a logical inference (since it requires too much cognitive effort or she has in-
sufficient knowledge), she might replace certain parts of the logical reasoning
with mere associations. Using associations may alleviate the reasoning effort
needed for argument evaluation and subsequently affect the argument accep-
tance. Moreover our long term aim is to be able to quantify the quality of the
argument acceptance decision, in terms of cognitive effort spent and number of
association rules used. These elements may allow an agent to evaluate the risk
to have been biased in her reasoning.
We apply our work on an agronomy scenario. Agronomy is a particu-
larly suitable field to this context of work because it involves many domain
experts with very different backgrounds (economists, sociologists, mathemati-
cians, computer scientists, transformation experts, agronomy experts, biologists,
chemists). We investigate the Durum Wheat variety selection in the context of
the French National Agency (ANR) DURDUR project1. The DURDUR project
suggests developing a systematic approach to investigate issues related to the
management of the nitrogen, energy and contaminants, to guarantee a global
quality of products throughout the production and the processing chain of Du-
rum Wheat with regards to pasta making. Started in 2014 and planned over 4
years, this multi-factorial approach aims at integrating the 3 dimensions of the
sustainability (environmental, economic, and social) and proposing technical
itineraries for Durum Wheat production. A task of integration by multi-criteria
analyses and knowledge engineering aims at identifying the efficient levers to
improve and guarantee the sustainability of the durum wheat agri-food chain.
This project is dealing mainly with symbolic knowledge (since the different tech-
nical itineraries for Durum Wheat are represented in terms of logical rules or
associations). The practical scenario considered in this paper will allow us to
highlight if some decisions and reasoning were based on mere associations rules
(i.e. non-pure logical reasoning). For instance we could explain why the ar-
gument of considering bio-fertilizers for Durum Wheat is potentially accepted
for the “wrong” reasons, i.e. by using associations coming from experts not
specialists of agronomy since the “bio” concept is associated with “sustainable
agriculture” and they subsequently neglect the extensive damage to the soil
done by such bio-fertilizers. In this case non-experts (or experts on complemen-
tary domains – economy, sociology, computing science) are more prone to biases
than agronomy experts.
We extend upon previous work [9, 8, 22] by the expressivity of the logical
1http://www.agence-nationale-recherche.fr/?Projet=ANR-13-ALID-0002
Figure 1: The proposed computational cognitive model
language considered as well as the natural transition between the two systems of
reasoning: logic based and association based and provide a proof of concept of a
true multidisciplinary application of cognitive science and artificial intelligence
to the service of agronomy technical innovation (Durum Wheat selection).
2 Paper in a Nutshell
In this section we present the different conceptual bricks that underlay the
foundation of our work.
Figure 1 shows the overall process that we propose. First let us clearly define
the purpose of the cognitive computational model. Please note that we do not
aim to model the human reasoning in all its complexity. The long term aim
of the computational cognitive model is to be able to function as a predictive
model for argument acceptance by domain experts. The argument acceptance
will be based on the expert profile (knowledge base, association rules, interest,
attention etc.) and its reasoning process. Our research hypothesis, based on the
dual process theory, assumes that the reasoning is done on two levels: on one
hand we have the crisp logical based reasoning and on the other the less crisp
association based reasoning.
The main contribution of the current work is to put in place such a com-
putational cognitive model and its composing bricks for reasoning (logical or
association based).
On the right hand side of the Figure 1 we consider a human agent having its
logical knowledge base (with factual observations about the world and generic
statements such as Miradoux is a wheat variety, wheat contains proteins), its
own associations (proteins are related to nutrition) and its opinions (I like Mi-
radoux, I don’t like spoiled wheat). The structure associated to an agent, called
the computational cognitive model, proposed in this paper is explained in Sec-
tion 3.
In the next section, we explain how we “fill in” the proposed cognitive model.
In our approach, the logical knowledge is stored as a logical knowledge base
(I, in Figure 1) expressed in Datalog+/- [12] (for re-utilisability purpose). In
practice, as detailed in Section 4.1, this base has been built from existing written
knowledge, namely ontologies about wheat.
The associations (II) (that can relate two pieces of information as well as a
piece of information to an appreciation - in that case it is called opinion) are
more difficult to elicit and are not often handled in the literature. One of the
main difficulties is that the associations depend on the profile of the person
(expert in wheat selection, non-expert, etc.).
To this end we devised a game with a purpose to elicit the associations of
the different people according to their profile. This is represented on the right
hand side of the image as the “neck” of the profile depicting the expert. It is
an original building block of our approach and it is detailed in Section 4.2.
A third parameter is also required by our model, namely, the cognitive avail-
ability (abbreviated ca) of the agent (III) which depends on the agent’s interest
about the particular argument and on the amount of attention he has to spent
(its precise definition is not studied here, it may be based on the agent mood, her
knowledge, sometimes on the speaker, on the topic of the argument, etc.). This
cognitive availability is a parameter that we use to filter the possible reasoning
the agent is able to do, see Section 5.
More precisely, on the left hand side of Figure 1, we show the proposed pro-
cess of argument acceptance using the cognitive model detailed in Section 5.
When the agent hears a new argument (step (1)), a number of critical questions
are fired (“is the premise of the argument correct?”, “do I agree with the con-
clusion?”, “can I infer the conclusion from the premise based on what I know?”
- step (2)).
Thanks to the proposed cognitive model, it will then be possible to compute
reasoning paths (i.e. sequences of logical rules and association rules constituting
a chain of inferences that leads to a desired conclusion) for each critical question
(step (3)). For a reasoning path we introduce the notion of effort (cognitive ef-
fort to use the rules of the reasoning path) which is confronted to the cognitive
availability of the agent. An association is usually effortless while logical rea-
soning is considered as more expensive. The cognitive availability of the agent
allows us to have an upper bound of the effort the agent is able to put into
her reasoning paths. The reasoning paths will be selected based on the effort
needed to carry on (step (4)). Based on this selection we can accept or reject
an argument. Please note that the reasoning paths will be constructed start-
ing from the logical knowledge base and the associations that computationally
represent the knowledge of the expert.
3 Agent Cognitive Model Definition
In this paper we want to cope with several kinds of reasoning mechanisms, this
is why we define the cognitive model of an agent to contain beliefs, associations
and opinions. These three kinds of inputs are used together in a first attempt
to incorporate Kahneman’s System 1 [31] ideas in a formal language. Roughly
speaking, System 1 is a human reasoning system dealing with quick, instinctive
and heuristic thoughts. By doing so, the aim is to have a framework allowing
to mix deductive and purely logical reasoning with System 1 reasoning.
The beliefs, opinions and associations are represented in a finite set of for-
mulas written in a Datalog+/-[12] language L. The language L is based on
a set of user-defined predicates P, a finite set of variables V (written in cap-
ital letters) and a finite set of constants C. A term is a variable or a con-
stant, an atom has the form p or p(t1, . . . , tn) where p is a predicate and
for all i ∈ [1 . . . n], ti is a term. In particular ⊥ is the predicate of arity
0 (hence an atom) representing the contradiction. Formulas of L are atoms
or rules2 i.e., expressions of the form ϕ( ~X, ~Y ) → ∃~Z ψ( ~X, ~Z) where ϕ and
ψ are conjunctions of atoms and ~X, ~Y and ~Z are (possibly empty) vectors
of variables representing respectively the variables occurring in ϕ and also ψ,
the variables occurring only in ϕ and the variables occurring only in ψ. An
opinion about a variable or a constant α ∈ C ∪ V is encoded by the use of
the predicates like, dislike and dontcare, those predicates being mutually ex-
clusive. Hence we assume that {like, dislike, dontcare} ⊆ P and that the
three clauses like(X) ∧ dislike(X) → ⊥, like(X) ∧ dontcare(X) → ⊥ and
dislike(X)∧ dontcare(X)→ ⊥ are present in any Datalog+/- base. Rules end-
ing in ⊥ are called negative constraints. In the following, we call proper rules a
set of rules not including any negative constraints.
A given agent cognitive model contains a finite set of beliefs B ⊆ L that con-
tains formulas that do not use the predicates {like, dislike, dontcare}, a set of
opinionsO ∈ L of formulas that contains at least one predicate {like, dislike, dontcare}
and a set of non-atomic clauses A ∈ L called association rules. The set A is
supposed to come from a manually translation of pairs of concepts that are
given by human people, this implies a certain degree of flexibility. For in-
stance, the association (buy sheba, cat owner) (associating someone who buys
the common cat food Sheba to a cat owner), could be translated as follows:
buys(Y, Z) ∧ sheba(Z)→ ∃Xcat(X) ∧ own(Y,X).
We define the notion of “reasoning” as the process of inferring a formula ϕ
using a sequence R of formulas from B ∪ O ∪ A on an initial set of pieces of
information K, denoted K ⊢R ϕ.
Definition 1 (Rule application and Dependency) Given a set of formu-
las K ⊆ L, and a rule r = ϕ( ~X, ~Y )→ ∃~Z ψ( ~X, ~Z) in L, r is applicable in the
2In [12] they are called “Tuple Generating Dependencies” (TGD) clauses.
context K iff there exists a substitution σ that unifies a conjunction of formulas
of K with ϕ( ~X, ~Y ). In that case, the result of the application of r to K with
substitution σ is ∃~Z ψ(σ ~X, ~Z).
A rule r is dependent on a set of rules R in a context K if r is not applicable
in the context K but r is applicable in the context resulting from one or several
applications of rules of R to K.
We call the successive application of rules depending on their predecessors
a “reasoning path”. Please note that our definition of rule dependency implies
the equivalent use of “∧” and “,” when handling conjunctions (resp. sets) of
formulas.
Definition 2 (Reasoning path) A reasoning path is a member of
R =
⋃
p∈N
(B ∪O ∪A)p
A reasoning path R of length p in the context K ⊆ L is denoted by the sequence
of its formulas R = 〈r1, r2, . . . rp〉 and is such that r1 is applicable in the context
K and any ri with i > 1 is dependent on {r1, . . . , ri−1} and {r1, . . . , rp−1} is
only composed of proper rules.
Inside this reasoning path we differentiate the use of logical inference formu-
las from the use of an association rule. A reasoning on a formula can be achieved
using different reasoning paths, each path has a cost depending on the cognitive
effort needed to use its formulas. Intuitively it is less costly to use association
rules (that are not far fetched) than using logical inference formulas.
The fact that some associations may be more or less far fetched is encoded
by a function e that associates a number which is higher if the association is less
immediate. More generally, the cognitive effort that the agent must do to use
an inference is a function e that associates to each rule a number, the more it is
difficult for the agent to use it the higher is this number. Note that we do not
consider the effort of exploration that is required for the agent in order to obtain
these reasoning paths.3 Moreover, we allow for the fact that an agent may not
know some formulas, it can be encoded by an infinite effort to use them. The
same convention is done for associations, if an association is not known by an
agent it has an infinite far fetched degree.
Now we are in position to define the cognitive model of an agent based on
the previous notions.
Definition 3 (Cognitive model) A cognitive model is a tuple
κ = (B,O,A, e)
3We assume here that the effort of exploration is somewhat included in the cognitive effort
associated to the rule, but in further research a statistical approach could be used: in a
reasoning path the cost of exploration could take into account the number of all the possible
formulas (with their different possible instantiations) that could apply at each step.
• B ⊆ L is a set of Datalog+/- wffs not using {like, dislike, dontcare} rep-
resenting beliefs
• O ⊆ L is a set of Datalog+/- wffs that use at least one predicate {like,
dislike, dontcare} representing opinions,
• A ⊆ L is a set of non-atomic clauses representing the associations,
• e is a function B ∪O ∪A→ N∪ {+∞} that represents the effort required
to use each Datalog+/- expression.
Before focusing on the cognitive evaluation of an argument, in the next
section we explain how it is possible to construct the knowledge bases for beliefs,
opinions and associations of the cognitive model.
4 Model Construction
In this section we detail how we constructed the model defined in the previous
section with regards to the DURDUR application. In face of the current issues
(climate change, price volatility, regulation changes, and environmental impact
decrease), the sustainability of the French durum wheat agri-food chain lies on
its capacities of organization, innovation and adaptation. The DURDUR project
integrates the knowledge base of the three kinds of actors of corresponding
profiles (environmental, economic and social). This is performed by formalizing
the technical itineraries provided by each actor group. The expressivity of the
language needed to represent and reason about such itineraries includes logical
inference (all durum wheat culture needs a precedence culture), opinions (I like
nitrogen reduction) and associations (Miradoux variety of durum is associated to
nitrogen fertilization). However, when an actor needs to evaluate the argument
of another actor (and agree upon its inclusion in the integrated knowledge base)
this evaluation is not always done in a fully logical way. It is important to be
able to predict how this evaluation is done in order to be able to correct it and
to explain the potential risks taken by using some dangerous associations rules
during a decision process.
Before we detail the evaluation of arguments let us first show how we con-
structed the logical formulas, opinions and associations of the various actors
involved. In Section 4.1, we present a knowledge base built specifically for the
Durum Wheat domain. In Section 4.2, we present a game introduced in order
to collect associations specific to stereotypical types of agents. Please note that
we will pay particular attention to the association rules capitalization as the
logical belief base construction is not an innovative process as such and done
using classical knowledge engineering methods [13].
4.1 Model Construction: Belief Base
The durum wheat belief base has been constructed within the DURDUR project.
The goal of this base, among others, is to integrate a part of the scientific
knowledge acquired during the project to redesign the durum wheat chain. The
base is used in many computational tasks, notably analyzing and comparing the
alternative innovative technical itineraries proposed in the project to reduce the
dependence to chemical inputs (nitrogen fertilizers and pesticides).4
The base represents domain-specific knowledge and it is composed of the
vocabulary, facts, rules and negative constraints. It is represented using exis-
tential rules (Datalog+/-) [12], a prominent knowledge representation language
that is generalizing some fragments of Description Logics. The vocabulary con-
tains 533 concepts and 200 relations. The rule base contains 30 rules while the
factual part has about 865 atoms e.g. the rule stating that if the durum wheat
is cultivated on soil which has a Colza precedent then the quality of this durum
wheat will improve. This can be formalized in Datalog+/- as
durumWheat(X) ∧ cultivatedOnSoil(X,Y )∧ precedent(Y, colza)
→ improvedQuality(X)
We will not insist on the rules and facts in the belief base, more details can be
found in [1].
4.2 Model Construction: Opinions and Associations
In order to represent associations in our model we use Associative Networks.
Associative Networks have been investigated as a way of representing human
memory. Starting from the PhD of Quillian 1966 [24] they have been used as a
way to provide intelligent machines with a working memory. In order to elicit as-
sociative networks from humans, different knowledge acquisition and elicitation
techniques have been used [35]. Such techniques range from direct interviews
and questionnaires to Games With A Purpose (GWAPs). The main idea in
GWAPs is to integrate tasks (such as image tagging, video annotation, knowl-
edge acquisition etc.) into games [33]. This technique is cheaper to implement
than other knowledge acquisition methods because it relies on entertainment
rather than material compensation while at the same time it yields similar or
better results as shown in [32].
In our model, we need to extract association lists for different profiles, each
profile representing a specific type of agents. This type of profile-based associ-
ation lists cannot be extracted using existing GWAP due to two main limits.
First, existing GWAPs do not take into account any information regarding the
agents themselves as their main purpose is to extract objective information (in-
formation that is shared by all agent), and second, these GWAPs only elicit
associative networks for concepts that come from a predefined list (dictionar-
ies, etc.). This poses problems since the game itself is not easily configurable
to focus on particular domains (e.g. a product or a process in DURDUR.) or
on particular kinds of complex concepts (e.g. “Pasta” vs “Pasta Quality” vs
“Good Pasta Quality”). While questionnaires can be used to extract the type
4All details about the Durum wheat base, as well as ways of downloading and using it can
be found at http://www.lirmm.fr/~arioua/dkb/.
of associative networks we need, they inherently lack scalability which greatly
limits the predictive capabilities of our model.
Therefore, and in order to make use of the scalability of GWAPs and the sub-
jective information extraction of questionnaires, we proposed in [22] a method to
build an associative network using a GWAP that takes into account the profiles
of the players to make explicit the differences in terms of associations between
stereotypical types of agents. Here, the associations creation task is transformed
into elements of a game where profile-teamed players construct and validate as-
sociations as a consequence of playing the game, rather than by performing a
more traditional direct questions-answering task.
In order to make sure we can extract profile-based associative networks, we
conducted an experiments in the domain of the DURDUR project in which we
were interested in the changes in associations between experts in transforma-
tion, experts in Life Cycle Analysis (LCA) and non-experts. We built profiles
implicitly using their expertise, and conducted game sessions on 15 concepts
specific to the DURDUR domain across two experiments. A first experimenta-
tion was carried out with 9 experts of the DURDUR project (7 of them were
transformation experts while the rest were LCA experts). A second experimen-
tation was carried out with 15 undergraduate students in computer science from
the University Institute of Technology (IUT) in Montpelier. All 24 participants
played 15 game sessions that they successfully completed.
Concretely, the participants played a game session where they were shown
the concept name in English, a description in French and optionally a photo
representing the concept, (e.g. For “Pasta Quality”, the game displayed “Pasta
Quality” as concept name, “Qualite´ des pates” as a description, and an image of
pasta). Each participant was then asked to give associations in English, organize
them from most relevant to least relevant and, optionally, give an opinion for
each association (⊕ like, ⊙ dontcare, ⊖ dislike).
In this game, the aim of the players was to produce common associations (or
what they thought is common) for their particular profile. More precisely, the
participants were earning points when they gave associations already given by
other participants within the same profile. In our case, the students knew that
their profiles were corresponding to non-experts in agronomy, and as such they
tried to give general associations in order to maximize their points. In contrast,
the agronomy experts gave associations emphasizing technical associations that
are relevant to their domain of expertise.
An important aspect to highlight is that participants are encouraged to give
associations they think are typical for their group because we want to obtain a
rather stereotypical profile of particular classes of people (we consider experts
and non-experts in the remainder of the paper, but it could be anything else,
for instance “man aged between 20 and 30”). By playing, participants will by
themselves reason about the type of players they are associated with and elicit
obvious associations relating to this group (even if the participant himself does
not use these associations).
The participants gave a total of 1623 associations (along with their opinion
on each association) for 15 concepts. Here we will only present 3 concepts, of
which we show the full results for the concepts “Pasta Quality” and the partial
results for “Protein content” and “Couscous Processing” (shown in Tables 1, 2
and 3; please note that associations are ordered from most relevant on top to
least relevant at the end of the tables).
Table 1: Association Lists for “Pasta Quality”
All Participants Experts Non-Experts
Italy ⊕ Yellowness ⊕ Italy ⊕
Cooking time ⊙ Color ⊙ Cooking time ⊙
Taste ⊙ Protein Content ⊕ Price ⊙
Protein Content ⊕ Texture ⊕ Taste ⊙
Yellowness ⊕ Stickiness ⊕ Brand ⊙
Nutrition ⊕ Starch ⊙ Nutrition ⊕
Price ⊙ Cooking loss ⊖ Slow Sugar ⊕
Color ⊙ Taste ⊙ Gluten ⊙
Gluten ⊕ Drying Temperature ⊕ Tomato Sauce ⊕
Brand ⊙ Hydration ⊕ Panzanni ⊕
Average relevance: 0.08 Average relevance: 0.22
LCA Experts Transformation Experts Non-Experts
Yellowness ⊕ Color ⊙ Italy ⊕
Texture ⊕ Protein Content ⊕ Cooking time ⊙
Strach ⊕ Yellowness ⊕ Price ⊙
Nutrition ⊕ Stickiness ⊕ Taste ⊙
Protein Nature ⊙ Drying Temperature ⊕ Brand ⊙
Network ⊙ Overcooking resistance ⊕ Nutrition ⊕
Cropping system ⊕ Gluten ⊕ Slow Sugar ⊕
Quantity ⊕ cooking loss ⊖ Gluten ⊙
Brightness ⊕ Texture ⊕ Tomato Sauce ⊕
Color Imperfection ⊖ Viscoelasticity ⊕ Panzanni ⊕
Average relevance: 0.38
If we take for example the association list for Couscous Processing, we can see
how certain information surfaces when we take profiles into account. By aggre-
gating associations based on profile we can expose valuable associations of the
experts (e.g. Semolina and Rolling and Durum Wheat) that have been drowned
in the associations of the entire group of participants (like Arab, Tajine). Also
please note that the associations of IUT students are similar to the associa-
tions of the whole group due to the higher number of students. This clearly
shows how not considering profile information suppressed the associations of
under-represented types of agents. We can also see in the association list for
Pasta Quality that based on the granularity of the profiles taken into account
we can generate different associations, for example, the associations for expert
and non-expert, and for specific types of experts, at each level of granularity
more subjective information is exposed, thus for the purpose of our model, we
Table 2: Association List for “Protein Content”
All Participants Experts Non-Experts
Meat ⊕ Quality ⊕ Meat ⊕
Muscle ⊕ Gluten ⊕ Muscle ⊕
Nutrition ⊕ Gliadine ⊕ Eggs ⊕
Quality ⊕ Nutrition ⊕ Nutrition ⊕
Eggs ⊕ Network ⊕ Chicken ⊕
... ... ... ... ... ...
Average relevance: 0.04 Average relevance: 0.23
Table 3: Association List for “Couscous Processing”
All Participants Experts Non-Experts
Semolina ⊕ Semolina ⊕ Arab ⊙
Arab ⊙ Rolling ⊕ Tajine ⊕
Water ⊕ Durum Wheat ⊙ Semolina ⊙
Tajine ⊕ Agglomeration ⊕ Water ⊕
Rolling ⊕ Water ⊕ Maghreb ⊙
... ... ... ... ... ...
Average relevance: 0.04 Average relevance: 0.19
tend to seek association lists with the finest granularity in profile construction
as they are more representative of the agent associations.
Using both the knowledge base and the association base, it is now possible
to study how an argument may be evaluated thanks to the cognitive model.
5 Argument Evaluation
Generally speaking, argumentation is a reasoning model based on the construc-
tion and the evaluation of interacting arguments. Those arguments are intended
to support / explain / attack statements that can be decisions, opinions etc.
Argumentation has been used in Artificial Intelligence for different purposes.
The main purpose is non-monotonic reasoning ([15]) where several frameworks
have been developed for handling inconsistency in knowledge bases (e.g. [7]).
Moreover, it has been shown that argumentation is generally enough to capture
different existing approaches for non-monotonic reasoning [15]. Argumentation
has also been extensively used for modeling different kinds of dialogues, in partic-
ular persuasion (e.g. [2]) and negotiation (e.g. [25]). Indeed, an argumentation-
based approach for negotiation has the advantage of exchanging reasons that
support these offers. The explanation dialogues were marginally investigated
[5, 4, 3].
In this paper and from the Argumentation theory we solely use two main
notions: the fact that information is structured into two parts (a premise and a
conclusion) and the three ways to attack an argument. We propose a new way
to evaluate their acceptance based on three critical questions related to those
three ways.
Usually, different agents will differently accept arguments according to their
associations and knowledge base. Since in DURDUR all actors do not have the
same level of expertise (according to their profile) sometimes argument evalua-
tion combines logical reasoning with ill-founded associations of ideas that people
made during their exposure to other domains. Such biased reasoning needs to
be detected in order to be corrected. With the long term purpose of building a
decision support system that predicts argument evaluation by domain experts
we need to start by investigating the problem of argument evaluation in presence
of logic-based and association-based reasoning.
Before going any further, it is mandatory to define the notion of argument.
We consider a simple definition for an argument given below. Note that we are
not requiring a link between the premise and the conclusion of the argument,
this allows us to consider arguments that are ill-formed on their warrant part
(the link in itself), be it because the argumentative agent is wrong and consid-
ers a “bad” rule, or because she is actually trying to manipulate her audience.
Moreover there is no requirement for the argument to be related to some par-
ticular cognitive model, because it will be evaluated as it is, by a given agent
with its own cognitive model. The only requirement is that it is expressed in
the logical language L.
Definition 4 (Argument) Considering the language of beliefs and opinions
L, an argument is a pair (ϕ ∈ L, α ∈ L) stating that having some beliefs and
opinions described by ϕ leads to concluding α.
Example 1 Let us consider an argument expressing that Miradoux is a very
good wheat variety since it contains proteins. This argument could be encoded
by: (has protein(miradoux), like(miradoux)).
In some work (such at [34]), whether or not an argument is acceptable de-
pends on critical questions. For the sake of generality, we propose to consider
the classical notions that are used in argumentation in order to define attacks
on arguments. Classically three notions are used, called rebuttal, undermine
and undercut. More precisely an argument (ϕ, α) can be attacked either on its
conclusion (α) directly or on a part of its premises (ϕ) or on the link between
the premises and the conclusion.
Definition 5 (Critical Questions) Given an argument (ϕ, α), we define:
• CQ1(ϕ, α)
def
= there exists R ∈ R, B ∪O ∪A ∪ {α} ⊢R ⊥
• CQ2(ϕ, α)
def
= there exists R ∈ R, B ∪O ∪A ∪ {ϕ} ⊢R ⊥
• CQ3(ϕ, α)
def
= there exists R ∈ R, B ∪O ∪A ∪ {ϕ} ⊢R α
Example 2 Let us consider a LCA expert on Pasta Quality as described in
Table 1 with the following cognitive state described below. Please note that the
expert will consider two types of Durum Wheat: miradoux and a spoiled version
of miradoux hereby denoted miradoux2. Also, please note that the set of formulas
in this example is not exhaustive; this choice being done for illustrative reasons.
B
1. wheat(miradoux)
2. spoiled wheat(miradoux2)
3. spoiled wheat(X)→ low protein(X)
4. low protein(X) ∧ has protein(X)→ ⊥
5. wheat(X)→ has protein(X)
6. has protein(X)→ nutrient(X)
O
1. dislike(miradoux2)
2. like(X) ∧ dislike(X)→ ⊥
3. like(X) ∧ dontcare(X)→ ⊥
4. dislike(X) ∧ dontcare(X)→ ⊥
A
1. nutrient(X)→ like(X)
2. has protein(X)→ dontcare(X)
The critical questions concerning the argument arg = (has protein(miradoux),
like(miradoux)) are:
• CQ1(arg) = there exists R ∈ R s.t. B ∪O ∪A ∪ { like(miradoux)} ⊢R ⊥
• CQ2(arg) = there exists R ∈ R s.t. B ∪ O ∪ A∪ {has protein(miradoux)}
⊢R ⊥
• CQ3(arg) = there exists R ∈ R s.t. B ∪ O ∪ A ∪ {has protein(miradoux)}
⊢R like(miradoux)
Intuitively, in order to determine if an argument is acceptable, we are going
to check if the agent can find a negative answer to CQ1 and CQ2 and a positive
answer to CQ3. The argument will be rejectable if the agent can find a positive
answer to one of the two first questions or a negative one to CQ3. The argu-
ment will be undecidable otherwise. Reasoning paths will allow us to define the
answers to critical questions. However, it is important to note that an agent
might not always be able to compute every possible answer to a critical question
(she might be tired or busy thinking about something else, for instance).
Some works are addressing this issue. For instance, the ELM model [11]
defines two “routes” that govern the reception of persuasive communications:
the central route, that involves a large amount of cognition and that has the
tendency to be more rational concerning the logical quality of the received ar-
gument, and the peripheral route, that involves little cognition and where argu-
ments are more likely to be evaluated thanks to simple cues such as the political
view on the advocated position, the liking of the speaker, etc. The determination
of the route is made thanks to two main factors: the interest in processing the
message and the ability (wrt. knowledge and cognitive availability) to process
it.
Hence, we assume here that each agent has a cognitive availability that
represents the maximum cognitive effort she is willing to make in order to rea-
son on an argument. The reader can refer to [10] for a more detailed study
of four extreme kinds of cognitive availability profiles, namely, engaged, qui-
escent, unconcerned and enthusiastic representing respectively an exclusively
logical reasoning, an exclusively association-based reasoning, a disinterest and
a superficial evaluation of an already convinced agent.
The cognitive availability will determine if the agent has the possibility to
be perfectly rational (which is reminiscent of Kahneman’s S2 reasoning) or if
she needs some heuristic in the form of associations in order to reason (leaning
towards Kahneman’s S1 reasoning). In our model, the current cognitive avail-
ability of an agent is denoted ca. Note that this current cognitive availability
may depend, among others, on the interest of the agent towards the argument,
her self-perceived proficiency on the considered topic, etc.
Example 3 Let us assume that all the formulas of B ∪O are associated with a
cognitive effort of 10 for a given agent and that the formulas of A with an effort
of 1. Considering the formula like(miradoux), the reasoning path to infer it
is 〈B1, B5, B6, A1〉 and requires a cognitive ability of at least 31. But with a
ca ∈ [21, 31[, the agent will also be able to compute dontcare(miradoux) with
the reasoning path 〈B1, B5, A2〉.
Given an argument, we compute reasoning paths wrt an effort c. A negative
answer with an effort c to a critical question corresponds to the non-existence
of a reasoning path inferring the conclusion that requires a cognitive effort less
or equal to c. A positive answer to a question is associated with the minimum
effort required to answer to the critical question (i.e., the effort required by the
minimum reasoning path inferring the conclusion).
Definition 6 (Positive/negative answers) Given an agent with a cognitive
model κ, a question CQ = (there exists R ∈ R, ϕ ⊢R ψ) and an integer c, we
say that:
• CQ is answered negatively with effort c, denoted negativeκ,c(CQ), iff there
exists no R ∈ R with Eff(R) ≤ c s.t. ϕ ⊢R ψ.
• CQ is answered positively with effort c, denoted positiveκ,c(CQ), iff there
exists R ∈ R with Eff(R) = c s.t. ϕ ⊢R ψ and for all c
′ < c, negativeκ,c′(CQ).
where Eff(R)
def
=
∑
r∈R e(r).
In the following, when not ambiguous, we simply denote negativeκ,c(CQ)
(resp. positiveκ,c(CQ)) by negativec(CQ) (resp. positivec(CQ)).
Note that this definition implies that a question will be answered by the
minimum effort path (this idea is in accordance with Kahneman theory and
was a starting point of our research).
Example 4 Considering the argument arg = (has protein(miradoux), like
(miradoux)) and the (B,O,A, e) described in Example 2 and 3, it holds that
positive31(CQ1(arg)) since 〈B1, B5, A2〉 allows to infer dont care(miradoux)
and O3 with like(miradoux) leads to ⊥. It also holds that positive22(CQ2(arg))
with the reasoning path 〈B6, A1, A2, O3〉, and that positive11(CQ3(arg)) with
the reasoning path 〈B6, A1〉.
Thanks to the previous definitions, we are now in position to formally de-
fine the problem of argument evaluation wrt an agent cognitive model and its
cognitive availability. Intuitively, an argument is acceptable by the agent if she
can establish the link between the premises and the conclusion (i.e., answer
positively to CQ3) and the agent has not enough cognitive ability to find a
counter-example for either the conclusion (i.e., she would answer negatively to
CQ1) or the premises (negative answer to CQ2). An argument is rejectable if
the agent is able to find a counter-example corresponding to one of the two
first critical questions (CQ1 and CQ2). An argument which is both rejectable
and acceptable is called undecidable, this may occur when the agent is able to
find a proof for CQ3 or for CQ1 independently but has not enough cognitive
availability to compute both proof together (see Proposition 7.1). Note that
given an argument (ϕ, α), when the agent’s cognitive availability doesn’t allow
her to establish the connection between φ and α, she may not be convinced
that α is not a consequence of the given premises. Hence we have defined the
weakly acceptable arguments for which the agent has no counter-argument and
the weakly rejectable arguments for with the agent is not able to find the link
between premise and conclusion. A conflicting argument is a particular case of
rejectable argument such that the agent has enough cognitive availability both
to prove that the link between premise and conclusion holds and to either prove
that the premise does not hold or that the conclusion does not hold. A confusing
argument is an argument for which the agent cannot prove anything (neither
the logical link nor the premise nor the conclusion).
Definition 7 (Potential status of arguments) Given an agent with a cog-
nitive model κ, a cognitive availability ca and an argument arg. We define:
• acceptableκ,ca(arg)
def
= there exists c ≤ ca s.t. positivec(CQ3(arg)) and
negativeca−c(CQ1(arg)) and negativeca−c(CQ2(arg))
• rejectableκ,ca(arg)
def
= there exists c ≤ ca s.t. positivec(CQ1(arg)) or
positivec(CQ2(arg))
• undecidableκ,ca(arg)
def
= acceptableκ,ca(arg) and rejectableκ,ca(arg)
• weakly acceptableκ,ca(arg)
def
= there exists c ≤ ca s.t. negativec(CQ1(arg))
and negativeca−c(CQ2(arg))
• weakly rejectableκ,ca(arg)
def
= negativeca(CQ3(arg))
• conflictingκ,ca(arg)
def
= there exists c+c′ ≤ ca s.t. positivec(CQ3(arg)) and
(positivec′(CQ1(arg)) or positivec′(CQ2(arg))).
• confusingκ,ca(arg)
def
= negativeca(CQ1(arg)) and negativeca(CQ2(arg)) and
negativeca(CQ3(arg))
Please note that the acceptability (resp. rejectability) does not mean that
the agent accepts (resp. rejects) the argument but rather that it is poten-
tially acceptable (resp rejectable) for her. Hence the notion of “potential sta-
tus”. Indeed, as we do not define the way the agent will allocate her cogni-
tive availability, the notion of acceptable argument is somehow credulous. She
might for instance exhaust her cognitive availability using a reasoning path for
positiveca(CQ3(arg)) even if she has a reasoning path for positiveca(CQ1(arg)).
Besides our definition of acceptable is a compact way to express that the cog-
nitive availability is parted into three efforts, one for each critical question, as
it is stated more explicitly in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Given an agent with a cognitive model κ and a cognitive avail-
ability ca, for any argument arg, it holds that: acceptableκ,ca(arg) iff there
exists c3 ≤ ca s.t. positivec3(CQ3(arg)) and for all c1, c2 with c1+ c2+ c3 = ca,
negativec1(CQ1(arg)) and negativec2(CQ2(arg)).
Proof: If there exists c3 ≤ ca s.t. positivec3(CQ3(arg)) and for all c1, c2 with
c1+c2+c3 = ca, negativec1(CQ1(arg)) and negativec2(CQ2(arg)), then it holds
for c1 = ca− c3 hence negativeca−c3(CQ1(arg)) and it also holds for c1 = 0, i.e.,
c2 = ca− c3, hence negativeca−c3(CQ2(arg)).
Conversely, if for any i ∈ {1, 2}, negativeca−c(CQi(arg)) then it holds for
any ci ≤ ca− c. 
The statuses have the following relations:
Proposition 2 Given an agent with a cognitive model κ, a cognitive availability
ca and an argument arg:
1. positivec(CQ3(arg)) and (positivec′(CQ1(arg)) or positivec′(CQ2(arg)))
with c+ c′ > ca implies undecidableκ,ca(arg)
2. conflictingκ,ca(arg) implies rejectableκ,ca(arg)
3. confusingκ,ca(arg) implies (weakly acceptableκ,ca(arg) and weakly
rejectableκ,ca(arg))
Proof:
1. If (positivec(CQ1(arg)) or positivec(CQ2(arg))) and positivec′(CQ3(arg))
with c+ c′ > ca then acceptableκ,ca(arg) and rejectableκ,ca(arg).
2. Due to the definition.
3. If negativeca(CQ1(arg)) then it also holds for a given c ≤ ca, similarly,
negativeca(CQ2(arg)) also holds for ca−c hence arg is weakly acceptable.
Moreover, confusingκ,ca(arg) implies negativeca(CQ3(arg)) which charac-
terizes a weakly rejectable argument.

Example 5 We have seen in Example 4 several possible reasoning paths for an-
swering the critical questions associated with the argument
arg = (has protein(miradoux), like(miradoux)) that are requiring different
cognitive efforts from the agent. Hence, it holds that:
• rejectableκ,ca(arg) if ca ≥ 22 since positive22(CQ2(arg)) (with the reason-
ing path R = 〈B6, A1, A2, O3〉),
• acceptableκ,ca(arg) if ca ∈ [11, 33[ since positive11(CQ3(arg)) and it re-
quires at least 22 to prove CQ2(arg), and at least 31 to prove CQ1(arg).
5
• confusingκ,ca(arg) if ca < 11, as the agent will not be able to use any path.
The two previous Propositions may give a clearer idea on the mechanism
of argument acceptance based on critical questions path evaluation. Moreover
the definition of acceptability implies that the evaluation may be done from
a restricted well chosen set of reasoning paths, hence they could be used to
define efficient algorithms. For instance, since it is only necessary to compute
a reasoning path that is minimal in terms of effort (for CQ3), then a best-first
search algorithm (such that the most promising node is the one minimizing the
total cost of the path) can be used.
This, of course, requires to be able to compare reasoning paths. For exam-
ple, the following definition provides a possible way of introducing comparison
between reasoning paths according to their use of either logical formulas or
associative rules.
Definition 8 (Reasoning path comparisons) Let R1,R2 ∈ R. We define
respectively precise, fast and compact preference relations as:
• R1 ⊑P R2 iff a(R1) ≤ a(R2),
• R1 ⊑F R2 iff l(R1) ≤ l(R2),
5Please note that for ca ∈ [22, 33[, we have both acceptableκ,ca(arg) and re-
jectableκ,ca(arg).
• R1 ⊑C R2 iff a(R1) + l(R1) ≤ a(R2) + l(R2),
with a(R) =
∑
r∈R∩A e(r) and l(R) =
∑
r∈R∩(B∪O) e(r).
In future work, this notion of comparison might allow us to introduce the
notions of accepted and rejected arguments based on the agent’s choice of rea-
soning paths. Note that it is also possible to define other preference relations, for
instance preferring reasoning paths using the least possible amount of opinion
formulas. Moreover, it would also be possible to combine them.
6 Discussion and Related Work
The highly influential cognitive psychology work in dual systems ([31, 14, 18, 6,
17, 28]) is based on two reasoning systems: one system that is slow but logically
precise and another system that is fast but logically sloppy. In this paper we
consider the problem of argument evaluation and, based on critical questions
satisfaction, extend the classical notions of argument acceptance statuses. We
propose a dual system cognitive model and show its instantiation in an agronomy
use-case.
As far as we know, our contribution is the first approach that formally defines
and extends the problem of argument evaluation in a practical scenario. It is
important to note that in this paper we do not define how a human being reasons
but we try to obtain the preferred reasoning paths that a human could obtain.
Hence, we do not simulate the agent reasoning but rather study the properties
of the possible reasoning paths that an agent can follow. This is why in our
proposal we assume that it is possible to compute a multiplicity of reasoning
paths, while in real life it is probable that a human agent will not do so.
We plan to clarify this in future work where we will introduce the status
of accepted (resp. rejected) argument for those arguments that are acceptable
(resp. rejectable) and for which the cognitive availability was allocated to the
“right” reasoning paths.
It should be noted that a guide to choose a path is the effort associated with
association rules and formulas. It seems important to study this notion in future
work as it might somehow represent the strength of an association. Indeed, a
very low effort represents an association that is very easy to make, and as such
using it does not depreciate the strength of the reasoning path too much.
Moreover our status definition can be enriched a lot, for instance it could be
interesting to take into account the agent’s self-assessment about her reasoning.
Indeed, when the agent is not able to understand the link from premise to
conclusion depending on her self-assessment she can decide to accept or reject
the argument. Namely, if her cognitive availability is proportionally high relative
to the complexity of the knowledge base, will she consider it to be a (defeasible)
reason to reject the argument when she cannot establish a proof.
Furthermore, our idea to evaluate the acceptability based on critical question
is very common, our originality is the use of reasoning paths. Note that some
reasoning paths answering the three critical questions may intersect pairwise.
So, once an agent has answered a critical question positively, she may already
have established some facts useful for answering another question. Hence, she
could save resources if she uses parts of already existing paths. Introducing the
possibility to freely reuse parts of reasoning paths would have repercussions on
the computation of arguments statuses. In that case the three computations
of reasoning paths answering to the three critical questions should not be done
independently anymore. In this paper, we did not try to account for overlapping
reasoning paths since it may render the agent search strategic (with respect
to the paths generated for one question and to the order the questions are
considered) while we are interested in a more general setting that allows for
irrationality at “all levels”. This implies the ability to consider any possible
reasoning path and any possible question answering order (neither of them being
necessarily optimal).
Reasoning paths search can be related to the search for defeaters which
is part of a classical more practical notion of acceptability. This pragmatic
condition is evoked e.g. in [20] it specifies how much resources (time, etc.) are
to be invested before deciding to accept an argument. Our model could be
extended by considerations such as this by equipping agents with a threshold
value that indicates how much time they need to spend on a search for defeaters
if an argument is to be accepted. These thresholds could be defined with respect
to the complexity of the knowledge base or to the possible cost of an error.
Finally and speaking about thresholds, it is important to clarify that in
this paper we do not consider the so called bounded rationality agents. The
notion of bounded rationality was introduced first by [26] and refers to the level
of information and computational ability demanded by a theory. If this level
is high then it will render impractical even straightforward applications of the
theory. This notion corresponds to the procedural biases as introduced by [21]
and [27] that is left for future work. However, it is interesting to mention that
such approaches might pave the way to use any-time approximation algorithms
(as already investigated in argumentation by [16]).
The main immediate perspective of work is the empirical evaluation of the
predictive power of our model using real human data. The main difficulty of
such evaluation is to make sure that the participants to the evaluation study do
not use other knowledge than the one explicitly present in the knowledge base
or the association rules. We are currently investigating different experimental
settings that overcome such problem.
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